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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Antonio Gonzalez appeals contending the district court erred in denying his 
motion for mistrial, based on the fact that the prosecutor’s minimally-relevant line of 
questioning unnecessarily risked, and in fact, resulted in, a comment on his invocation 
of his right to an attorney.  Mr. Gonzalez also asserts the district court abused its 
discretion by concluding it did not have authority to remove a competency evaluation 
from the presentence (hereinafter, PSI) packet prepared in this case because that 
competency evaluation was part of an old PSI appended to the PSI packet prepared in 
this case. 
 In regard to the comment on silence issue, the State contends the prosecutor’s 
line of questioning was acceptable exploration of inconsistencies in Mr. Gonzalez’s 
testimony and the prosecutor did not intend to infer Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt from the elicited 
comment.  On the PSI issue, the State asserts that issue is not properly raised on 
appeal absent fundamental error, and it contends there was no abuse of discretion in 
the district court’s ultimate decision to leave the evaluation attached to the PSI packet 
without reviewing the evaluation itself. 
 The State is mistaken.  As to the comment on silence issue, while the prosecutor 
may explore inconsistencies, such questioning is not proper when the defendant has 
actually invoked his rights.  Therefore, such questioning may not go into territory where 
the prosecutor knows there is a high risk of improper comment on the defendant’s 
invocation of his rights, especially when the probative value of such questioning is 
minimal.  As to the PSI issue, because the district court directly addressed the question 
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of whether it could remove the competency evaluation, the challenge to that decision is 
properly raised on appeal.  The State’s argument on the merits ignores previous Court 
of Appeals’ decisions which not only hold that the district court is authorized to remove 
improper competency evaluations from PSI packet prepared in this case, but instructs 
that is precisely what it should do.  As such, this Court should grant relief in this case. 
   
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Gonzalez’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Gonzalez’s motion for mistrial. 
 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a competency 
evaluation to be removed from the PSI materials. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gonzalez’s Motion For Mistrial 
 
The State’s primary contention on this issue is that the prosecutor is permitted to 
explore inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony in cross-examination, and 
therefore, the prosecutor’s questions, which led to the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s 
invocation of those rights, were not erroneous.  (Resp. Br., pp.11-13.)  However, as the 
cases the State cites in support of this assertion subsequently explain, the prosecutor’s 
ability to engage in that sort of cross-examination is not unfettered:  “In 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 . . . (1980), the Court held that the state’s cross-
examination of a defendant about prior inconsistent statements made at the time of 
arrest was not prohibited by Doyle.[1]  The Supreme Court stressed that the case did 
not involve a defendant who had relied upon his right to remain silent.”  State v. 
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 94 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).  Thus, where the 
defendant invokes his rights, such questions are still inappropriate.2  See id.  As the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held:  “If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of [a 
defendant’s] silence, for any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 . . . (1966), becomes so diluted as to be rendered 
worthless.”  State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 714-15 (1976). 
                                            
1 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
2 The Urquhart court ultimately found that error to be harmless based on a standard of 
harmless error review which, as will be discussed infra, the United States Supreme 
Court subsequently disavowed because it would result in violations of defendants’ 
constitutional right to a trial by jury.  See Urquhart, 105 Idaho at 95; compare 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993). 
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Here, as in Urquhart, Mr. Gonzalez exercised his right to remain silent by 
invoking his right to an attorney.  Therefore, a full understanding and application of the 
cases the State cites reveals that, despite the prosecutor’s general ability to explore 
inconsistencies in a defendant’s testimony on cross-examination, the prosecutor’s 
questions in this case were, in fact, inappropriate under Doyle and White.  
That conclusion is even more evident given the Idaho Supreme Court’s more 
recent decision in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011), which the State does not 
acknowledge in its brief.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  In Ellington, the Supreme Court 
held that, when the prosecutor’s questions are delving into a minimally-probative area 
and the prosecutor is aware of the high risk that the questioning will result in an 
improper comment on the defendant’s exercise of his rights, the questioning is 
improper.  Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61.  Here, as in Ellington, there was no reason for the 
prosecutor to be asking the questions which elicited the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s 
invocation of his rights, and the prosecutor was aware of the risk that such a comment 
could be elicited.   
Specifically, the problematic line of questioning was asking Mr. Gonzalez to 
repeat his answers to the officer’s questions, a conversation memorialized in an audio 
recording which had already been admitted as evidence and published to the jury.  As 
such, there was little probative value to the prosecutor’s line of questioning because it 
was merely cumulative.  (Compare Tr., p.140, L.24 - p.141, L.4 (sustaining an objection 
to a similar question to the officer for the reason that the jury had already heard the 
recording of the conversation).)  The prosecutor also admitted she was aware this line 
of questioning presented a high risk of eliciting a comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s 
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invocation, as she claimed, in formulating her questions, she “ha[d] been particularly 
careful not to let that happen.”  (Tr., p.329, L.25 - p.330, L.1.)  However, as Ellington 
points out, such efforts are not sufficient to justify the risk of asking such questions.  
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61 (finding error despite the prosecutor’s representation 
“that he phrased the question . . . in a leading way in order to avoid a comment on 
Mr. Ellington’s silence.”).  Therefore, as in Ellington, because there was no justified 
reason for the prosecutor to be asking those questions in light of the known risk of error, 
the prosecutor’s questions in this case were improper. 
The State also argues that the prosecutor did not attempt to infer Mr. Gonzalez’s 
guilt from the elicited comment on his invocation.  (Resp. Br., pp.13-14.)  However, that 
argument is contradicted by the prosecutor’s statements to the district court:  The 
prosecutor said her aim with this line of questioning was to show Mr. Gonzalez was “in a 
position to tell [the officers], if he wants to, that there was self-defense.  He’s now 
making up self-defense that didn’t exist before after having the opportunity to look at the 
report . . . .”  (Tr., p.331, Ls.1-7.)  Therefore, the prosecutor’s expressed purpose was to 
infer Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt (that he hit Mr. Steele without legal justification) because he 
chose not to tell the officers about the alleged self-defense claim (i.e., because he 
invoked his right to an attorney) on the night of the incident.  The State’s argument to 
the contrary is meritless. 
Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Gonzalez had made other statements to the 
officers prior to his invocation (see Resp. Br., p.14 (focusing on Mr. Gonzalez’s “what 
fight” statements)) is ultimately irrelevant to whether the prosecutor’s final question – 
“Does somebody come at you, you don’t say that they did?” (Tr., p.329, Ls.10-11 
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(emphasis added)) – improperly risked eliciting a comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s decision 
to invoke his rights rather than tell officers about the self-defense issue, and thus, make 
the inference of his guilt.  As such, the prosecutor’s questions were seeking to infer 
Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt from his invocation, and so, that line of questioning was 
inappropriate. 
Finally, the State contends that, even if the comment on Mr. Gonzalez’s 
invocation was erroneous, that error was harmless.  (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)  It bases that 
argument on the other evidence in the record, which it asserts would prove 
Mr. Gonzalez’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite the error.  (Resp. 
Br., pp.15-16.)  That argument is directly contrary to United States Supreme Court 
precedent. 
When an error is objected-to below, Idaho employs the harmless error test 
established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 221 (2010).  The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
Chapman test requires the reviewing court to look “to the basis on which ‘the jury 
actually rested its verdict.’”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991) (emphasis from Sullivan).  Thus, the question 
is “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error.  That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in 
fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might 
be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee.”  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis from 
original); cf. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013) (recognizing this is the proper standard 
for harmless error review in Idaho).  Therefore, as the United States Supreme Court has 
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made clear, “no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be,” if 
the State has not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this error did not contribute to 
the verdict actually rendered, the error is not harmless.  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 
(emphasis added).  As such, the State’s harmless error argument which is that the 
conclusion of Mr. Gonzalez’s guilty is inescapable because of all the other evidence in 
the record, is wholly inappropriate, and if adopted, would result in a violation of 
Mr. Gonzalez’s constitutional right to a jury trial. 
Since the State has not offered a valid argument as to why this error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it has failed to carry its burden in that respect.  
See, e.g., State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013).  Regardless of whatever 
other evidence was presented, the State has not proved the jury did not conclude 
precisely what the prosecutor intended for them to conclude – that Mr. Gonzalez hit 
Mr. Steele without justification due, at least in part, to the fact that he chose to request 
an attorney rather than tell the officers about the self-defense issue the night of the 
incident.  (See Tr., p.331, Ls.1-7.)  Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility the error 
contributed to the verdict actually rendered in this case.  Thus, the error was not 
harmless. 
 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Ordering A Competency Evaluation To 
Be Removed From The PSI Materials 
  
A. This Issue Is Properly Raised On Appeal 
The State contends that, because Mr. Gonzalez did not formally request the 
competency evaluation be removed from the PSI materials below, he cannot raise this 
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issue on appeal absent a showing of fundamental error.  (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.)  
However, that argument ignores the fact that an issue may be raised for the first time on 
appeal when that issue was “decided by the trial court.”  State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 
553 (1998) (“Since this issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, we will 
decide this issue on appeal.”).  In this case, the trial court directly addressed this issue, 
deciding it would not remove the competency evaluation based on its conclusion that it 
did not have the authority to do so.  (Tr., p.417, L.4 - p.418, L.17.)  Because the issue 
was directly addressed by the trial court below, the challenge to that decision is properly 
raised on appeal. 
 
B. The District Court Had The Authority To, And So, Should Have Removed The 
Improper Competency Evaluation From The PSI Packet Prepared In This Case  
 
On the merits of this issue the State asserts that the district court’s decision – just 
to not consider the information itself – was a reasonable choice within the scope of its 
discretion.  (Resp. Br., p.19.)  However, the State does not respond to Mr. Gonzalez’s 
contention that the district court nevertheless abuses its discretion when it acts without 
recognizing the full scope of its discretion.  (App. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Anderson, 152 
Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2011)).)  In fact, the State acknowledges none of the previous 
decisions on this topic in advancing its argument.  (See generally Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) 
The Court of Appeals has made it clear that, not only does the district court have 
the discretion to remove such evaluations from the PSI packet prepared in this case, 
that is precisely the sort of action it should take:  “In light of these concerns, the district 
court should cross out the portions of the PSI referencing the competency evaluations in 
violation of Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, detach the 
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competency evaluations from the PSI, and forward a corrected copy to the Department 
of Correction.”  State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 823 n.3 (Ct. App. 2010).  Therefore, 
regardless of the reasonableness of its decision to not consider the evaluation itself, the 
district court still abused its discretion because it acted without recognizing the full 
scope of that discretion.   
Furthermore, the State’s argument on the merits has already been rejected by 
the Court of Appeals:  “[I]t was insufficient to simply disregard the information at 
sentencing and, instead, the court should also redline it from the PSI so that this 
information could not prejudice the defendant in the future.”  State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 
720, 722 (Ct. App. 2010) (explaining the rule emerging from State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 
950 (Ct. App. 2010) and State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis 
added).  The problems caused by failing to do this do not relate to whether the future 
court or board reviewing the PSI packet would be aware the competency evaluation 
was removed (see Resp. Br., pp.19-20), though certainly, given the facts of this case, a 
reviewing authority presented with the old PSI packet and the PSI packet prepared for 
the present case would be able to see, had the district court redlined the information as 
the Court of Appeals has instructed, that a competency evaluation had been 
erroneously included in the old PSI packet.  (See App. Br., p.16.)  Rather, the problems 
arise from the fact that the evaluation remains in the PSI packet at all, and so, may be 
considered by a future evaluator.  See Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1 (detailing the 
problems that arise when this sort of information is erroneously left in a PSI packet).   
Since the district court decided to leave that competency evaluation in the PSI 
packet prepared in this case, the problems identified by the Court of Appeals continue 
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to exist in this case.  Therefore, proper application of the controlling authority reveals 
that the district court did, in fact, abuse its discretion when it decided to leave that 
evaluation in the PSI packet prepared in this case.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Gonzalez respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial.  He also requests that this Court instruct the 
district court on remand to order the competency evaluation stricken from his PSI 
information. 
 DATED this 1st day of March, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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